

## ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES

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### ABSTRACT

Connected and fully automated or autonomous vehicles (CAVs) are becoming increasingly viable as a technology and may soon dominate the automotive industry. Once CAVs are sufficiently reliable and affordable, they will gain greater market penetration, generating significant economic ripple effects throughout many industries. This paper synthesizes and expands upon analysis from multiple reports on the economic effects of CAVs across 13 different industries and the overall economy.

CAVs will soon be central to the automotive industry, with software making up a greater percent of vehicle value than it had previously and hardware's percentage value falling. The number of vehicles purchased each year may fall, due to vehicle-sharing within families/across household members or through shared fleets, but rising travel distances and a shift away from air travel may lead to greater vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) and ultimately higher vehicle sales (due to faster fleet turnover from heavy daily use). Heavy commercial trucks may be the first industry to implement CAV technology in order to increase efficiency. The opportunity for drivers to do other work or rest during long drives may allow heavy trucks to travel for longer periods of time, at lower cost, reducing the demand for rail transport. Personal transport may shift toward shared autonomous vehicle (SAV) fleet use, threatening the business of taxis, buses, and other forms of group travel. Fewer collisions and more law-abiding vehicles, due to smarter, automated vehicle operations, will lower demand for auto repairs, traffic police, medical, insurance, and legal services. CAVs will also impact infrastructure investment and land use, leading to new methods for managing travel demands and a repurposing of some land, such as curbside and off-street parking.

A reduction in crashes and tighter headways between vehicles, thanks to inter-vehicle communications and automation may decrease traffic congestion, but this improvement could be limited by increased vehicle miles traveled (VMT). CAVs will also generate savings from productivity gains during hands-free travel and a reduction in collision costs. Assuming that CAVs

1 eventually capture a large share of the automotive market, they will have major economic impacts,  
2 on the order of \$1.2 trillion total or \$3,800 per American per year. All estimates provided here are  
3 largely speculative, since the future of CAVs and the forces that will influence their adoption and  
4 use are still highly uncertain, but this paper presents important considerations for the overall effects  
5 of CAVs on the U.S. economy and quantifies the impacts.

## 7 INTRODUCTION

8 Over the past decade or more, advances in the automotive and technology sectors have opened up  
9 the potential for the computerized-automation of the driving task. Every major automobile  
10 manufacturer and multiple technology companies, such as Apple, Google, and Uber, have begun  
11 research and development of autonomous vehicles (AVs). AVs have on-board computers, rather  
12 than occupants, managing all vehicle movements. AVs may set off a revolution in transportation  
13 on a grand scale, across nations and continents. Any real transformation will require significant  
14 adoption or market penetration, but widespread use of AVs will generate a profound impact on  
15 many industries and markets throughout the U.S. economy and around the world. The critical  
16 level of adoption or market penetration has not been studied, but increasing levels of adoption will  
17 result in increasing economic effects. This paper anticipates AVs' effects on the most directly  
18 affected industries and on the overall U.S. economy by synthesizing existing literature and  
19 evaluating cost and sales changes.

20 To begin this discussion, it is useful to note that the U.S. Department of Transportation has defined  
21 five Levels of Automation (Aldana 2013). Level 0 implies no computer assistance for driving  
22 activities, while Level 1 involves function-specific automation for activities, like assistive parallel  
23 parking, adaptive cruise control (ACC), lane-keeping assistance (LKA), and electronic stability  
24 control (required on all new light-duty vehicles sold in the US since 2012). Level 2 is the  
25 combination of two or more of these features into a semi-autonomous vehicle - such as ACC plus  
26 LKA. Level 3 includes self-driving automation with full control of all critical safety functions  
27 under certain conditions - but the driver is still expected to take over in some instances (e.g., a  
28 confusing work zone or inclement weather). Level 3 will likely have significant economic impacts  
29 on the most directly related markets, such as the automotive and technology industries. Level 4 is  
30 the ultimate stage of automation, in which vehicles are fully self-driving - without need for human  
31 intervention; they can synchronize caravans of many vehicles and valet-park themselves.  
32 Connectivity between these vehicles will be developed in advance of and alongside rising  
33 automation, allowing for crash alerts, better coordination of vehicle speeds, and extended convoys.  
34 Once a large fleet of Level 4 AVs has been deployed, economic effects will increase and influence  
35 markets well beyond those directly related to AV production.

36 Connected and highly automated or fully autonomous vehicles (CAVs) utilize automated vehicle  
37 technology in coordination with other vehicles and infrastructure via communications devices.  
38 CAVs have the potential to generate widespread improvements in safety and time savings, but  
39 their value extends well beyond these specific factors, into the broader economy. Although CAVs  
40 will naturally cause losses in some industries, the overall impact on the U.S. economy should be  
41 positive, as Morgan Stanley estimates an overall potential value of \$1.3 trillion annually, or 8% of  
42 the entire U.S. GDP (Lewis 2014). An understanding of the trajectories of the specific business  
43 sectors affected, both positively and negatively, may be critical in effectively preparing for CAVs'  
44 economic impacts. Preparation includes making strategic decisions to best harness this change.

1 Previous papers by companies like KPMG (2015), Morgan Stanley (2014), and McKinsey and Co.  
 2 (2013), as well as research by Fagnant and Kockelman (2015), have examined different aspects of  
 3 the U.S. transportation system and economy. This review paper focuses on the economic effects  
 4 of fully autonomous vehicles on specific markets by compiling and integrating economic research  
 5 from top articles and studies. It also expands upon past research by using data to generate estimates  
 6 of industry-wide shifts as percentages of industry size, total monetary values, and dollars per  
 7 capita. For the purpose of this report, these values for economic shifts are evaluated as net  
 8 economic benefits to society, because the decrease in revenues to a given industry represent a  
 9 decrease in cost to customer that leads to greater overall income and wealth. Analyzed industries  
 10 include automotive, technology, freight movement, personal transport, auto repair, medical care,  
 11 insurance, law, infrastructure, land development, digital media, police, and oil and gas. These  
 12 industries were selected after preliminary research on potential effects, and are expected to  
 13 experience the largest shifts from the development of CAVs. The paper concludes with a look at  
 14 the more wide-ranging effects on the economy such as improvements in safety, productivity, and  
 15 fuel economy. Thoughtful examination of all these industries and CAVs' more pervasive effects  
 16 enables a valuable picture of likely impacts on the U.S. economy, which can significantly impact  
 17 policy, planning, investment, and design decisions, by public agencies, private businesses,  
 18 investors, and the public at large.

19

## 20 **INDUSTRIES ANALYZED**

### 21 **Automotive**

22 The industry most obviously and directly affected by the design, adoption, and use of CAVs is the  
 23 automotive industry. The auto industry is one of the strongest forces in the U.S. economy,  
 24 employing 1.7 million people, providing \$500 billion in worker compensation annually, and  
 25 accounting for about 3-3.5% of GDP (Hill et al. 2010). In 2015, automakers sold a total of 17.5  
 26 million cars and light trucks, at a cost of \$570 billion to American consumers (Spector et al. 2016).  
 27 CAVs will influence not only the use and design of motorized vehicles but also redefine business  
 28 strategies of companies within and outside the automotive industry.

29 One likely market expansion for vehicle production will come from increase in vehicle-miles  
 30 traveled (VMT). This will be due to the ability of children, persons with disabilities, and elderly  
 31 people to enjoy the convenience of automotive travel without the liability of physically driving the  
 32 vehicle (The Economist 2012). Childress et al. (2015) simulated four different scenarios for CAVs'  
 33 VMT effects across the Seattle region, assuming added capacity (due to shorter headways between  
 34 smart cars), changes in values of time, avoided parking costs, and VMT fees/road tolls. They  
 35 estimated regional VMT increases of 3.6 percent to 19.6 percent, except when marginal cost tolls  
 36 were applied, and VMT fell 35.4 percent, relative to the business-as-usual, no-automation case  
 37 (Childress et al. 2015). Zhao and Kockelman's (2016) recent travel demand forecasting work  
 38 predicts VMT increases of 20 percent or more, across the Austin region, due to CAVs and shared  
 39 autonomous vehicles (SAVs), which can be accessed by many different occupants throughout the  
 40 day.

41 However, private ownership of automobiles may fall dramatically as "on-demand" car rental fleets  
 42 and services develop, similar to Uber and Lyft, but driverless (Diamandis 2014, Fagnant and  
 43 Kockelman 2015, Fagnant et al. 2015). Only 12% of all U.S. vehicles are in use/on the road during  
 44 the nation's peak moment (nearly 5 pm) of the average weekday, making vehicle sharing a very

1 viable option (Silberg et al. 2013; Fagnant and Kockelman 2015). If vehicle sharing becomes a  
2 significant mode choice, it could decrease the personal demand for automobiles by millions of  
3 units every year, in the U.S. alone (Silberg et al. 2012). Forbes Magazine (Diamandis 2014)  
4 estimated that this fact could cause the cost of transportation per mile to drop five- to ten-fold,  
5 though Chen et al. (2016) put the final monetary costs at closer to 50 cents per mile (vs. the \$0.57  
6 to \$0.74 per mile that AAA [2016] estimates for typical driving distances and vehicle types, as  
7 incurred by private-car owners in the U.S.). While a 50 to 90 percent drop in cost seems unlikely,  
8 especially in the near term, SAVs will lower per-mile travel costs as technology costs fall. If SAVs  
9 gain a large share of the market but people continue to ride rather independently in these  
10 autonomous taxis, VMT may increase due to unoccupied/empty-vehicle travel between  
11 consecutive travelers.

12 Alternatively, if carpooling and hub-and-spoke models for vehicle sharing become more  
13 widespread, VMT may decrease. According to a report by the University of Michigan  
14 Transportation Research Institute (Schoettle and Sivak 2015), if empty-vehicle driving of  
15 privately-owned vehicles is allowed, CAVs may cause many families to choose to own just one  
16 car rather than two, if there is limited “trip-scheduling overlap” for different household members  
17 (so they would share the vehicle throughout the day). In an extreme case, CAVs could cause a  
18 drop in personal ownership, from 2.1 cars per household to 1.2 cars per household, on average,  
19 representing a 43% reduction in the average number of household vehicles but much greater use  
20 of each vehicle and lots of empty VMT. Heavier use of any vehicle will mean faster retirement or  
21 scrappage – though CAVs may crash much less often, resulting in somewhat longer lifespans –  
22 and lower car-buying rates (Li and Kockelman 2016, Fagnant and Kockelman 2015).

23 Overall, total production and sales of passenger vehicles will probably rise, thanks to added  
24 demand for vehicle use, to more distant destinations. However, if shared vehicles are well  
25 maintained and so used for longer distances before retirement (much the way New York City taxis  
26 are used for far more miles than the typical household vehicle, before retirement), it is possible  
27 production rates will not rise as much as VMTs would suggest. New York City taxis travel  
28 approximately 70,000 miles per year, and the average age of a New York cab is 3.3 years  
29 (NYCTLC 2014). Assuming a taxi life of 5-6 years, New York taxis travel around 350-400  
30 thousand miles in their lifetime. A similar model of vehicle care would allow shared vehicles to  
31 experience similarly lifetimes. Moreover, major fleet operators are likely to be sophisticated  
32 consumers and negotiators, and may want to purchase smaller vehicles, resulting in lower profit  
33 margins for vehicle manufacturers. Perhaps to insulate themselves from potentially big drops in  
34 demand or price, many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are already teaming with  
35 Transportation Network Companies – like General Motors with Lyft, Toyota with Uber, and  
36 Volkswagen with Gett (Kokalitcheva 2016). With an estimated VMT increase of approximately  
37 10 percent (Childress et al. 2015), a corresponding increase in vehicle sales would likely range  
38 from 5-10 percent, due to some of the growth being taken up by the rise of shared vehicles. With  
39 approximately 17.5 million vehicle sales in the U.S. (YCharts 2017), the number of cars sold per  
40 year would increase by 875,000 to 1.75 million, corresponding to an increase in sales by \$28.5 to  
41 \$57 billion. Although it is unclear how significant the factors affecting demand in each direction  
42 will be, automobile companies will undoubtedly face a very different landscape – in demand,  
43 suppliers, and pricing.

44 As demands shift, companies will want to strategically re-position themselves, in order to adapt to  
45 the industry’s fundamental evolution. Once fully autonomous vehicles become pervasive, greater

1 emphasis will be placed on software and digital media (vs. basic vehicle performance), forcing  
 2 organizations to specialize in certain areas. Jonas et al.'s (2014) report for Morgan Stanley  
 3 suggested that the auto industry may be completely reorganized into three key provider categories:  
 4 hardware manufacturers, software suppliers, and integrated "experience" creators.

5 Hardware refers to the car essentially as we know it today (90% of the value of a current roadway  
 6 vehicles) (Jonas et al. 2014), and companies that choose to specialize in this segment will continue  
 7 to design and manufacture the body, powertrain, interior, lighting, and other basic components.  
 8 This position is likely for smaller car companies without a competitive advantage in software  
 9 development, because they will not be able to invest enough resources to generate  
 10 competitive/comparably intelligent in-car systems. These companies will outsource the software  
 11 to businesses that specialize in automotive operating systems. As software's importance increases,  
 12 Jonas et al. (2014) argue that hardware will become increasingly commoditized, with only the most  
 13 critical hardware components commanding significant pricing power, potentially dropping the  
 14 relative value of hardware to 40% of the value of the car. In order to deal with falling margins on  
 15 hardware sales, top vehicle manufacturers may add value through car sharing fleet operations,  
 16 multi-modal journey planning, and other mobility-promoting services (Feick 2013).

17 Presently, software constitutes approximately 10% of vehicle value. While influencing many  
 18 automotive functions, the software-hardware interfaces are largely independent of each other. In  
 19 AVs, software components will become coordinated into a central, universal operating system, to  
 20 control the powertrain, infotainment, and autonomous features, and may eventually represent 40%  
 21 of the car value (Jonas et al. 2014). Jonas et al. (2014) expect that larger auto manufacturers, larger  
 22 suppliers, and leading technology companies (like Google, Apple, and Microsoft) will be  
 23 responsible for such production. Similar to the smartphone industry, software-focused companies  
 24 are forecast to sell and install their operating systems in vehicles manufactured by companies  
 25 specializing in hardware, while car companies with large sums of resources will be able to invest  
 26 in their own software development to generate a cohesive, integrated experience. Although this  
 27 evolution may decrease profit margins in the hardware segment, the increasing value of software  
 28 gives stronger automakers a new opportunity to generate revenue and opens up the market for tech  
 29 companies.

### 30 **Electronics and Software Technology**

31 As alluded to above, technology firms may have the most to gain from the development of CAVs.  
 32 Technology firms may emerge as entertainment providers and/or important players in the vehicle-  
 33 production process, thanks to their competitive advantages in artificial intelligence (AI)  
 34 applications (Jonas et al. 2014). AI has become rather critical to making real-time/rapid human-  
 35 like judgements in complex transport settings (e.g., navigating a new intersection with various  
 36 bikes and pedestrians present, alongside a right-turning heavy-duty truck or bus).

37 Google's self-driving cars have travelled over 1 million miles in California, with only 12 accidents  
 38 - and none ruled the Google car's responsibility (Google 2015). Much speculation has surrounded  
 39 Apple's entering the AV game, under possible name "Project Titan" (Price 2015). Intel Capital's  
 40 director confirmed that Intel recently launched a \$100 million Connected Car Fund to "spur greater  
 41 innovation, integration, and collaboration across the automotive technology ecosystem" (Silberg  
 42 et al. 2012, p. 24). With all these big players investing significant time and capital into CAVs, it  
 43 seems likely they will play important role in the transport revolution and stand to gain large profits  
 44 from it.

1 As noted earlier, Morgan Stanley estimates software costs rising from 10% of current car values  
 2 to 40% in a CAV environment (Jonas et al. 2014). IHS Technology's Juliussen (2015) estimates  
 3 that the U.S. self-driving software and its corresponding updates will grow from \$680 million in  
 4 2025 to \$15.8 billion in 2040. Similarly, IHS projects the built-in map and map-upgrade services  
 5 to grow from \$530 million in 2025 to \$10.6 billion in 2040 (Juliussen 2015). Together, these  
 6 services may offer \$26.4 billion in new revenues over a 15-year period, for the U.S. alone.  
 7 Software sales and the potential to integrate software into an entirely proprietary automobile,  
 8 present major profit-making opportunities for technology firms. One challenge technology  
 9 companies could face is the cyclical, price-sensitive nature of the automotive industry, which has  
 10 not been so obvious in electronics and software markets (Jonas et al. 2014). Overall, revenues and  
 11 profits from the second most expensive item most consumers purchase, after their home or rent,  
 12 are very attractive, to a number of firms, especially those in the tech industry.

### 13 **Trucking/Freight Movement**

14 The economics of the trucking and ground-shipping industry could also experience a significant  
 15 boost from the development of CAVs. The next step of automation in commercial vehicles is  
 16 assisted highway trucking, in which Level 1 or Level 2 CAVs will help reduce truck collisions,  
 17 through features like lane centering and adaptive cruise control. After assistive systems, fully  
 18 automated vehicles will allow convoying, in which the lead driver of a chain of multiple trucks is  
 19 in control of driving, but the following trucks require no human input and are connected wirelessly  
 20 to the lead truck. Convoy systems would allow long-distance drives with large quantities of goods  
 21 and avoid many driver-based hours-of-service restrictions. Attendants may still be on board,  
 22 resting, helping with drop-offs and pick-ups, and perhaps performing administrative tasks en route,  
 23 but driver jobs may be eliminated in the long term. This new system would improve safety and  
 24 efficiency, saving trucking companies fuel, time, and money. Convoys do create issues with other  
 25 traffic merging, changing lanes, and traffic signals, but this system could reduce accident rates and  
 26 cut fuel consumption by 15% (Heutger et al. 2014).

27 McKinsey estimates that the economic gains of driverless vehicles in the trucking industry could  
 28 be range from \$100-500 billion per year by 2025 (McKinsey 2013). The bulk of these savings  
 29 would come from the elimination of the wages of the truck drivers. According to the American  
 30 Trucking Association (2015), the industry employs over 3 million truck drivers, and the  
 31 automation of driving poses a huge threat to the livelihood of these truck drivers. At this time,  
 32 however, there is already a shortage of about 25,000 truck drivers because of the long hours and  
 33 time away from home (American Trucking Association 2015). So, CAVs could simply increase  
 34 the capacity of logistics companies, allowing for more shipments. The role of the truck driver could  
 35 become more technical, as they would need to monitor the CAV system to ensure it is running  
 36 properly. Such a role would likely require training and could increase the value and wage of  
 37 individual truck drivers. In such a scenario, the cost per truck driver would increase, the number  
 38 of hours of transportation per driver would increase, and the number of drivers would decrease.  
 39 CAVs would undoubtedly be of massive benefit to the freight transportation and trucking industry  
 40 but could decrease opportunities for employment of millions of truck drivers.

### 41 **Personal Transport**

42 CAVs could also transform the transportation industry beyond the automotive industry, affecting  
 43 trains, planes, and public transport. When vehicles no longer require an operator, occupants will  
 44 be at liberty to use that time for productive work or even sleep. This found time on car trips might

1 decrease the demand for fast transportation (Diamandis 2014). For example, if a destination is 10  
2 hours away by car, a family or businessman may opt to make the trip overnight, sleeping while the  
3 car takes them to the destination, instead of making the flight. Bus, airline, train, and car rental  
4 companies could all be affected by the CAVs' added convenience. Fleets of platooning CAVs  
5 could replace trains as a more fuel efficient and convenient solution to mass long-distance transit.  
6 Another possibility is that SAVs would provide easier access to these forms of mass transportation.  
7 Trains also have the added benefit of dedicated right of way, which avoids much of traffic  
8 congestion. With SAVs, passengers could be transported directly to the location of the bus, train,  
9 or plane without the need for parking their personal cars long-term. If VMT increases with the rise  
10 of CAVs, such a system could allow travelers to avoid the higher cost of riding the full distance in  
11 their personal vehicle. The expansion of such overnight transportation may be limited by customer  
12 demand, due to the desire for comfort and privacy. While costs of such travel may be cheaper and  
13 easier, many travelers may still prefer the speed of airline travel or convenience of riding in their  
14 own vehicle.

15 The biggest change in personal transportation as a result of development of CAVs will likely be  
16 in the mode of transportation for short commutes. With CAV technology, companies could  
17 develop an "on-demand" taxi service with SAVs that would make human-driven taxis obsolete. In  
18 fact, GM already has a fully automated taxi prototype that is summoned by a phone app, and Uber  
19 has begun operation of a self-driving shared fleet in Pittsburgh (Uber 2016). At peak vehicle usage  
20 during rush hour, around 5 PM, less than 12% of all personal vehicles are on the road (Silberg et  
21 al. 2013). The Brookings Institute makes an even bolder claim that vehicles sit unused an average  
22 of 95% of the time (Brookings 2015). Although the jobs of taxi and bus drivers will be threatened  
23 by CAVs, "outsourced" driving accounts for less than 2% of personal transportation, so the impact  
24 to the wider economy will not be particularly large (TRB 2016). Vehicle sharing also has the  
25 potential to decrease inefficiencies in our current transportation system.

26 While the effect on long-distance transportation is less clear, public transportation and taxi services  
27 are most directly affected by fully automated vehicles and shared fleets. The public transportation  
28 and taxi industries account for \$66 billion and \$20 billion in annual revenue, respectively  
29 (IBISWorld 2015, IBISWorld 2016). Ride sharing apps have already caused a 6.7 percent annual  
30 decrease in taxi service between 2011 and 2016 (IBISWorld 2016) and decreases as large as 30  
31 percent in Los Angeles and 65 percent in San Francisco (Nelson 2016, Kerr 2014). With the  
32 addition of CAVs to ride sharing services, a 50 percent decrease in taxi revenues would cause a  
33 shift in \$10 billion in revenue toward ride sharing. Ride sharing and CAVs are not as direct of a  
34 substitute for public transportation, and public transportation is less expensive compared to private  
35 driving services like taxis, so the shift would likely not be as pronounced. A 25 percent shift in  
36 public transportation revenues, however, still represents \$16.5 billion in decreased public  
37 transportation revenue. In total, the changes in taxi and public transportation revenues account for  
38 \$26.5 billion out of the total \$86 billion in revenue, equating to a percent change of 30.8 percent.  
39 At the very least, CAVs will take a bite out of the personal transportation providers like taxis,  
40 buses, and trains, and could extend as far as redefining car usage, making vehicle ownership more  
41 of a luxury than a necessity.

## 42 **Auto Repair**

43 With 360 degree sensors, no distractions, and no drunk driving, driverless cars will be able to  
44 largely eliminate car crashes caused by human error, which amount to over 90% of crashes in the  
45 U.S. currently (McKinsey 2013). Collision repair shops will lose a huge portion of their business.

1 Indirectly, the decreased need for new parts for crashed vehicles would also decrease the demand  
2 for manufactured parts from steel producers and part manufacturers. In 2013, almost \$30 billion  
3 in repairs were caused by vehicle crashes in the United States (Stahl 2014). Higher levels of market  
4 penetration will cause proportionally higher percent reductions in crashes. Assuming a 25%  
5 reduction in crashes, the industry would lose \$7.5 billion in revenue, and at a 50% reduction, auto  
6 repair revenue would decrease by \$15 billion. Finally, at 100% market penetration, in the best  
7 case scenario, we would experience a 90% reduction in crashes and a \$27 billion reduction in  
8 revenue in the industry.

9 Some auto shops could find new opportunities in aftermarket personalization of vehicles,  
10 customizing the new, more important interior of the CAV, but this will likely not be enough to  
11 cover the losses from their usual business (McKinsey 2013). As the level of automation increases  
12 and crashes fall, a large percentage of collision repair shops will lose revenues and be forced out  
13 of business. Despite the societal gain due to decreased crashes, collision repair shops are likely to  
14 face serious losses.

15 One effect that could be of benefit to the auto repair industry is the increased road time of CAVs  
16 through sharing systems. Although there may be fewer total cars, the cars in use could be on the  
17 road for 12 hours per day, which will cause an increase in the miles travelled and the overall need  
18 for maintenance. CAVs will still provide an increase in safety, but this increased number of road  
19 hours allows for more opportunities for crashes or malfunctions that would give business to the  
20 collision repair shops. The size of the impact on the industry is unclear, but collision repair  
21 businesses that retain their current model will likely face revenue losses. The consumer savings  
22 from reduced repair expenses can be applied to other goods and services that will deliver greater  
23 utility and generate economic activity.

#### 24 **Medical**

25 Another industry that will lose business from the improved safety of CAVs is the medical industry.  
26 Approximately two million hospital visits and 240,000 extended hospitalizations per year in  
27 America are due to traffic accidents, and driverless cars would eliminate a large majority of these  
28 emergency room visits (The Economist 2012). McKinsey & Co. (2013) estimated that the  
29 combination of auto repair and health care bills could save consumers \$180 billion, which would  
30 generate proportional losses for service providers. The National Highway Traffic Safety  
31 Administration estimates that motor vehicle crashes accounted for \$23 billion in medical expenses  
32 (NHTSA 2015). With a 25% crash reduction, this accounts for a loss of \$5.75 billion in the  
33 medical industry, \$11.5 billion at a 50% reduction, and \$20.7 billion at a 90% reduction. Although  
34 there will also be savings from the decreased need for supplies and doctors, and space could be  
35 cleared in overcrowded emergency rooms, the financial situation will be altered for medical  
36 providers. Also, a large proportion of organ donations come from automobile crash victims who  
37 are registered organ donors, since they are younger and healthier at the end of their lives. While  
38 the total hospital revenue may decrease by billions of dollars, hospital care generates about \$1  
39 trillion in annual revenue (Plunkett 2016), the estimated loss only accounts for 1-2% of the market.  
40 A potential benefit for hospitals is that they could reallocate personnel to better serve other needs.  
41 With emergency rooms often overrun with patients, this would allow hospitals to better serve the  
42 public.

#### 43 **Insurance**

1 Safety improvements as a result of CAVs will require insurance agencies to adapt and possibly  
2 reconstruct their fundamental business models. Currently, insurance companies sell policies to  
3 individual vehicle owners and human drivers are liable for car crashes. Insurance agencies  
4 currently net \$180 billion annually in the U.S. insuring against automobile accidents and the  
5 related medical costs (Desouza et al. 2015). When driving becomes the job of computers, however,  
6 the issue of whether the driver is liable for the crash becomes more ambiguous. Automakers and  
7 the vehicle's software providers will likely become the main responsible party and will need to  
8 purchase insurance for technical failure of the automobiles, making personal policies more limited  
9 in scope (Silberg et al. 2012). Liability may be placed on the driver for authorizing driving in wet,  
10 icy, or otherwise unsafe conditions, causing a need for some coverage. However, greater  
11 responsibility, under normal circumstances, will likely shift to the software and hardware  
12 manufacturers.

13 Additionally, the added safety of CAVs that are nearly error-free will reduce the number of crashes  
14 significantly. According to a report by KPMG, over 90% of accidents each year are caused by  
15 driver error, and accident frequency could drop as much as 80% with commercially viable Level  
16 4 fully automated vehicles (Albright et al. 2015). Even the automation of parts of the driving task  
17 has decreased insurance claim frequency. David Zuby, executive vice president and chief research  
18 officer of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, claims that "vehicles equipped with front  
19 crash prevention technology have a 7-15% lower claim frequency under property damage liability  
20 coverage than comparable vehicles without it" (Albright et al. 2015). KPMG also hypothesizes  
21 that more costly technology under the hood of CAVs could increase the average collision expense  
22 from today's \$14k to around \$35k by 2040 (Albright et al. 2015).

23 Ultimately, KPMG estimates that CAVs could shrink the auto insurance industry by as much as  
24 60% (Albright et al. 2015). With the current revenue of the auto insurance industry at  
25 approximately \$180 billion, this decrease could represent a decrease in revenues of \$108 billion.  
26 Insurers will need to develop fewer but larger corporate policies to maintain profitability. Vehicle  
27 owners will still need insurance for theft and comprehensive coverage for hail, flooding, as well  
28 as more limited liability coverage which will likely cause a decrease in premium per policy  
29 (Insurance Business 2015). Overall, this could make small auto insurance companies based in  
30 personal policies less viable and give more power to large businesses based in corporate contracts.  
31 Since there are far more insurance companies than auto manufacturers, this push for large policies  
32 for automated systems will cause competitive insurance pricing and big winners and losers in the  
33 battle for these corporate contracts.

#### 34 **Legal Profession**

35 The result of fewer accidents from the automation of driving will likely challenge the profession  
36 of many attorneys. Around 76,000 attorneys in the United States specialize in personal injury  
37 (Langham 2015). With a total number of around 1.3 million practicing attorneys in the United  
38 States, personal injury lawyers make up approximately 6% of the American lawyer population.  
39 Vehicle collisions are the most common type of tort case, accounting for around 35 percent of all  
40 civil trials (McCarthy 2008). Law school is already becoming a more challenging path because of  
41 a current oversupply of attorneys, and the decrease in demand for personal injury lawyers would  
42 hurt career prospects even further. With an average liability claim for bodily injury of \$15,443, a  
43 total number of crashes of around 5.5 million in 2012, and an average contingency fee of around  
44 33-40%, the revenue loss from personal claim lawsuits could be as much as \$3.2 billion (Langham  
45 2015). The detriment to the profession could be offset by population growth and an increase in

1 tort claims. Regardless, the landscape of the legal profession will be much different, at least in the  
2 scope of personal claims.

### 3 **Construction and Infrastructure**

4 CAVs may also induce a reduced demand for construction of parking lots, a change in the  
5 development of roadways, and an increased need for technology infrastructure. A potential  
6 increase in traffic efficiency would decrease congestion and the need for new, bigger roadways.  
7 If vehicle sharing reaches a sufficient level of development, a decreased need for parking would  
8 result and, thereby, reduce the demand for new parking lots and garages and allow for the  
9 redevelopment of existing garages. Development costs for all forms of construction and living  
10 costs in these areas could also drop due to lower parking requirements. Despite these increases in  
11 efficiency, it will likely be somewhat offset by the increase in VMT due to greater vehicle access  
12 and population growth. The designers and contractors of these large structures will get less  
13 business than they are used to and might need to adapt their businesses to include other types of  
14 infrastructure as a result.

15 Additionally, the way in which roadways are maintained and the component structures required  
16 may change. When vehicles become fully automated, there may no longer be a need for extra-wide  
17 lanes, guardrails, traffic control signals, wide shoulder, or rumble strips among other safety  
18 measures, and manufacturers of these components will lose a source of income. With sufficient  
19 market penetration, CAVs may be safe enough to allow the government to stop investing in these  
20 costly infrastructure safety measures. Data can be used by Departments of Transportation to  
21 analyze road use patterns and better plan the maintenance and improvements that are still needed.  
22 KPMG estimates that intelligently controlled intersections could perform 200-300 times better  
23 than current traffic signals (Silberg et al. 2012). KPMG also states that platooning could increase  
24 the effective capacity of roadways by as much as 500%, resulting in an estimated 10% reduction  
25 in infrastructure investment, saving around \$7.5 billion per year (Silberg et al. 2012).

26 The infrastructure that is needed could be revolutionized alongside automobiles. An integral part  
27 of creating CAVs is Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. GPS, sensors, 3D planning,  
28 design, and construction tools can be used to help plan, design, and build more integrated and  
29 efficient transportation systems. With wireless transponders called Roadside Units or other smart  
30 embedded sensors, cars and infrastructure can exchange information about curvy roads and low  
31 bridges, risks such as construction and information about traffic density, flow, volume, and speed  
32 (Bennett 2013). In order to remain competitive, contractors that base their business on large  
33 government commissions for highway and infrastructure construction will need to be on the cutting  
34 edge of this technology.

### 35 **Land Development**

36 CAVs will change transportation for people in all parts of the nation, and, therefore, will impact  
37 personal habits and land use. CAVs will likely transform the national parking system. According  
38 to Eran Ben-Joseph, parking lots and garages cover more than one-third of the land area in some  
39 U.S. cities, creating unsustainable urban dead zones in centers where population density is  
40 increasing rapidly (Diamandis 2014). CAVs will help mitigate this issue of overcrowding by  
41 allowing people to be dropped off at their location without the need to find a parking spot. On top  
42 of this, vehicle sharing will keep vehicles in more constant use and serve more people, further  
43 decreasing demand for parking infrastructure. The land area previously used for parking could be  
44 converted into housing, parks, or other useful developments that replace these parking dead zones.

1 There are approximately 105 million for-pay parking spaces in the U.S. and approximately 720  
 2 million spaces including the non-paid commercial spaces, a home space, and a work space for each  
 3 vehicle (Chester 2010). At an average land value of \$6,300 per parking space, the total land value  
 4 of parking spaces is \$4.5 trillion (VTPI 2017). If the amount of parking decreases by just 1% each  
 5 year, \$45 billion in property value will be freed annually. Parking will become more efficient and  
 6 demand will decrease with the advent of CAVs, opening up land for other uses. The commercial  
 7 real estate industry generates \$931 billion in annual revenue (IBISWorld 2016), so the \$45 billion  
 8 in land could provide opportunity for a 5% increase in land development revenue.

9 Another possible impact of CAVs on land development is the extension or contraction of urban  
 10 sprawl. The automobile is the invention that originally caused the development of suburban  
 11 neighborhoods due to the increased distance one could travel in a given period of time and the fact  
 12 that land further from city center costs less per square meter. CAVs could allow for a decrease in  
 13 time of commutes due to easing of congestion and an increase in productivity during the commute,  
 14 as the passenger is no longer required to focus all attention on driving, which could increase the  
 15 draw of suburban housing. With the ability to engage in activities other than driving during the  
 16 commute, the cost of transportation declines, increasing the value of living further from the urban  
 17 core (Anderson, et al. 2014). Alternatively, CAVs could cause a loosening in the urban real estate  
 18 market, reducing the cost of urban living and encouraging families to move into town (Greeting  
 19 2014). The opportunity to increase urban density would also encourage development and  
 20 movement into the city center. Bansal and Kockelman's (2016) survey results determined that  
 21 almost 7.4% of households expect to move more centrally, while 11.1% expect to move outward.  
 22 So, while outward expansion will likely dominate, its effects may be limited by the increased  
 23 efficiency of urban travel with SAVs. Additionally, the effects in different locations may differ  
 24 based on local factors, such as population growth, demographics, and existing infrastructure.  
 25 However, it is important to pay attention to the impact on land availability and preference going  
 26 forward for the development of real estate.

## 27 **Digital Media**

28 The extension of digital media into the CAV environment will open up the market for even more  
 29 users and, thereby, more sales. At the point of full automation, commuters who usually spend time  
 30 vigilantly watching the road (or dangerously multitasking on their smartphones) will demand  
 31 greater integration of digital media features into their automobiles. Content providers like  
 32 YouTube, Netflix, and social media networks will see a large benefit from the increased time and  
 33 desire for their services on commutes.

34 Additionally, a study by McKinsey & Co. suggests that internet shopping could receive a large  
 35 bump from this added free time, stating that each additional minute occupants spend on the internet  
 36 could generate \$5.6 billion annually, totaling \$140 billion if half of the time of the average round-  
 37 trip commute (25 minutes) is spent surfing or shopping (McKinsey 2015). Even if only 5% of the  
 38 average commute is spent on digital media, the annual value would total \$14 billion. A possible  
 39 loss due to this increase in entertainment flexibility for drivers is a decreased demand for radio and  
 40 recorded music. Drivers will no longer be captive to audio-only entertainment, allowing them to  
 41 forgo their usual radio programs for more stimulating visual ones. The boon for the overall  
 42 entertainment market, however, could be quite significant, as a report from Morgan Stanley  
 43 suggests the value of content in the automotive industry could shift from minimal to almost 20%  
 44 of the value of the car (over \$6,000 for the average cost of a car) (Jonas et al. 2014).

## 1 **Police (Traffic Violations)**

2 Due to a decrease in human driver error and misbehavior, the importance of traffic cops and  
3 parking wardens will likely decrease as well. Drunk driving, speeding, and other traffic violations  
4 will become less frequent and the size of the police force will decrease (The Economist 2012). A  
5 survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that 31 million people were involuntarily stopped  
6 in 2011, more than 85% of those stops traffic related, and over half of all contact between civilians  
7 and police is related to vehicles (Zagorsky 2015). Another side effect of increased traffic obedience  
8 will be a loss of revenue for governments, as traffic fines make up a significant source of money.

9 According to the National Motorists Association, the traffic ticket industry brings in between \$7.5  
10 to \$15 billion (Bax 2008). According to The Arizona Republic, approximately \$10.8 million, or  
11 1.1%, of Phoenix's \$1.03 billion budget in 2014 came from traffic ticket fines (Giblin 2015).  
12 Although \$10 million is significant, a simple 1% of the city's budget is recoverable from other  
13 sources. Small towns, however, may be more strongly affected by law-abiding CAVs. While only  
14 five towns in Colorado earned more than 30% of revenue from traffic fines, the small city of  
15 Campo generated 93% of its budget from fines and forfeitures in 2013 (Kuntz 2015). These results  
16 are outliers from "speed trap" towns, but still this shift would be significant to these specific  
17 municipalities. Assuming a 50% reduction in the \$10 billion in traffic ticket fines per year, CAVs  
18 would account for a \$5 billion decrease in government revenue. Some of this loss may be  
19 recovered, however, through savings from the decreased need for traffic police.

20 Government officials in small cities will have to find a way to adapt to this revenue loss. A  
21 decreased payroll due to fewer highway patrol officers will slightly offset this, but governments  
22 could also make up for lost revenue by charging infrastructure usage fees or road tolls (Silberg et  
23 al. 2012). Toll roads have been implemented for specific highways, but expanding this  
24 systematically would require a large infrastructure investment. Traffic tickets will not be  
25 eliminated until there is 100% market penetration of CAVs, but the decrease in revenue will be  
26 felt gradually, and local and state agencies will want to prepare for this change.

## 27 **Oil and Gas**

28 A more efficient system of driving will also cause ripple effects in the oil and gas industry.  
29 Platooning, computer-controlled, and lighter cars interacting with more efficient infrastructure will  
30 contribute to an overall improvement in fuel efficiency (Silberg 2012). The Texas Transportation  
31 Institute estimated that congestion costs Americans 4.8 billion hours of time, 1.9 billion gallons of  
32 fuel, totaling \$101 billion in combined delay and fuel costs (Silberg 2012). Platooning could  
33 reduce highway fuel use by up to 20% solely due to the decreased drag coefficient from drafting  
34 (Silberg 2013). The decreased need for parking will improve fuel efficiency as well, as one MIT  
35 study found that 40% of total gasoline use in cars in urban areas is spent looking for parking  
36 (Diamandis 2014). While this number may be a high estimate, the ability for SAVs to move onto  
37 serving the next occupant without needing to find parking would improve overall vehicle  
38 efficiency. Furthermore, SAV fleets could make electric vehicles a more viable option and even  
39 financially preferable for fleet management companies. Despite an increase in fuel efficiency,  
40 VMT is expected to rise by 10 percent due to the increased accessibility of CAVs and repositioning  
41 of SAVs in fleets (Childress et al. 2015). The overall increase in fuel consumption will be limited  
42 by the increases in efficiency, leading to a total fuel use increase of around 5%, resulting in an  
43 annual revenue increase of \$14 billion out of the \$284 billion market. The increased vehicle  
44 efficiency and increased VMT largely offset each other in the oil and gas industry.

1

## 2 **ECONOMY-WIDE EFFECTS**

3 CAVs will increase the capacity of the nation's transportation system due to improvements in  
4 efficiency. First, with well-developed, accurate computing systems, traffic accidents, which  
5 account for 25% of traffic congestion, will be greatly reduced as approximately 93% of accidents  
6 are due to human error (Fagnant and Kockelman 2015). This fact will increase roadway capacity  
7 and potentially save around \$488 billion due to a reduction in injuries and deaths due to collisions  
8 (Jonas et al. 2014). Additionally, if VMT does not rise, congestion is likely to fall due to the  
9 increased efficiency of coordinated vehicle speeds and traffic flows, due to data sharing between  
10 cars, synchronization of traffic signals, and fewer crashes. Pinjari et al. (2013) estimate that  
11 connected CAVs will cause a 22 percent increase in highway capacity at 50 percent market  
12 penetration, 50 percent capacity increase at 80 percent market penetration, and 80 percent increase  
13 at 100 percent market capacity.

14 Easier travel means greater demand for travel, however. Fully automated vehicles will enable  
15 children, elderly, and disabled people greater access to meaningful destinations and activities at  
16 all times of day. Such vehicles will make longer trips seem less burdensome for former drivers.  
17 These behavioral changes will increase VMT and may worsen congestion on many if not all  
18 roadways, but the increased efficiency of smaller headways (if mandated) and coordinated  
19 movements on highways may outweigh these effects on many roadway types (Pinjari et al. 2013).

20 "Driver" productivity will also rise as a result of the added time that can be used for other tasks,  
21 like working during one's trip to the office. Diamandis (2014) estimates that CAVs could save  
22 over 2.7 billion unproductive hours in work commutes, generating an annual savings of \$447.1  
23 billion per year in the U.S. alone (assuming 90% CAV penetration). This time savings estimate,  
24 combined with \$488 billion from collision costs amounts to total savings of \$1.1 trillion in the  
25 U.S., or 8% of the U.S. GDP, and as much as \$5.6 trillion worldwide (Jonas et al. 2014).

26 Some effects brought on by CAVs could counteract and limit these gains. Once CAV sharing is  
27 put into action, although fewer cars will be needed, those in use will accrue mileage more quickly  
28 and require maintenance more often. Additionally, the increased convenience and affordability  
29 may encourage more vehicle travel, offsetting the pollution and crash benefits (Litman 2015). The  
30 economic effects of CAVs will extend beyond the simple crash, productivity, and fuel saving into  
31 every facet of the American economy.

## 32 **CONCLUSIONS**

33 The purpose of this study was to identify the industries most impacted by the rise of CAVs and to  
34 examine the forces that affect these industries and the economy as a whole. The table below shows  
35 the 13 industries that were selected and ordered based on the immediacy and size of the impacts  
36 on each. The analysis showed an annual percentage change and overall annual dollar value change  
37 based on the size of the industry. Although individual businesses that do not adapt to this change  
38 may be hurt by the rise of CAVs, the economic effects are generally viewed as societal savings  
39 that would feed back into the economy through businesses and to consumers. On top of the effects  
40 on specific industries, everyone will experience the benefits of the time savings from decreased  
41 congestion and added productivity from the hands-free driving environment of CAVs. According  
42 to the 2015 Consumer Expenditure Report, transportation accounts for 17 percent of average  
43 household income, 7.5 percent vehicle purchases, 3.7 percent on fuel, 1.2 percent on public

1 transportation, and 4.9 percent on other vehicle expenses, such as maintenance and repairs and  
 2 insurance (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). Comparatively, average household expenditures also  
 3 include 32.9 percent for housing, 12.5 percent on food, 11.3 percent on insurance, 7.8 percent on  
 4 healthcare, 5.1 percent on entertainment, 6.9 percent for utilities (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).  
 5 Transportation will be directly impacted by the rise of CAVs, and nearly all of the other largest  
 6 contributors to household expenditures will be heavily influenced by CAVs, as well.

7 The economic value reflected in each of the industries and the economy-wide totals do overlap in  
 8 some places, limiting the overall total economic value. The total collision reduction value is also  
 9 reflected in the economic savings from the decreased spending in the auto repair, medical,  
 10 insurance, and law industries. The majority of the value saved in each of these industries is due to  
 11 a reduction in collisions, so a total value of \$144 billion is reduced from the overall total.

12 CAVs will transform our economy and change the landscape of almost every industry. Although  
 13 some sectors will be more significantly affected than others, ripple effects will be felt throughout  
 14 most, if not all industries. As the effects compound, the overall magnitude of the impacts would  
 15 multiply. The technology still has a long road of development ahead and market penetration will  
 16 define the size of the impact of driverless vehicles. With the assumption that CAVs will eventually  
 17 become pervasive, or at least hold a large share of the automotive market, it is assured that they  
 18 will have a strong economic impact, potentially as much as \$1.2 trillion or more. In order to prepare  
 19 for this revolution, we must be aware of the potential effects so that we can alter our established  
 20 systems to best harness these changes. Change is coming, and we must be prepared to adapt in  
 21 order to thrive in the developing economic landscape.

22  
 23 **TABLE 1 Summary of Economic Effects (Industry and Economy-Wide)**

<b>Industry-Specific Effects</b>				
<b>Industry</b>	<b>Size of Industry (billions)</b>	<b>Dollar Change in Industry (billions)</b>	<b>Percent Change in Industry</b>	<b>\$/Capita</b>
Insurance	\$180	-\$108	-60%	\$339
Freight Transportation	\$604	+\$100	+17%	\$313
Land Development	\$931	+\$45	+5%	\$142
Automotive	\$570	+\$42	+7%	\$132
Personal Transportation	\$86	-\$27	-31%	\$83
Electronics & Software	\$203	+\$26	+13%	\$83
Auto Repair	\$58	-\$15	-26%	\$47
Digital Media	\$42	+\$14	+33%	\$44
Oil and Gas	\$284	+\$14	+5%	\$44
Medical	\$1,067	-\$12	-1%	\$36

Construction/ Infrastructure	\$169	-\$8	-4%	\$24
Traffic Police	\$10	-\$5	-50%	\$16
Legal Profession	\$277	-\$3	-1%	\$10
<b>Industry-Specific Total</b>	\$4,480	\$418	9%	\$1,312
<b>Economy-Wide Effects</b>				
<b>Type of Savings</b>		Dollar Change in Industry (billions)		\$/Capita
Productivity		\$448		\$1,404
Collisions		\$488		\$1,530
<b>Economy-Wide Total</b>		\$936		\$2,934
Collision Value Overlap		\$138		\$432
<b>Overall Total</b>		\$1,217		\$3,814

1 += Industry Gain - = Industry Loss  
2 \$/per capita and Total: All values added due net economic/consumer benefit  
3

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