

TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONGESTION PRICING

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ABSTRACT

Congestion pricing of high-demand roadways seeks to influence travelers’ route choices, trip timing, modes, and destination choices, to keep vehicles moving and avoid excessive congestion. This paper describes the use of various technologies to enable more advanced and cost-effective congestion pricing applications, and a credit-based policy to ensure equitable network access for all travelers.

Video-based systems require cameras to capture the state of traffic, plus some form of communication back to users. Both DSRC and cellular-based systems use GPS data to price roads and toll users based on traffic conditions. DSRC employs roadside units (RSUs) to receive and send messages to in-vehicle DSRC units. A cellular-based system could use communications from cellular towers in combination with a smartphone, on-board diagnostics port (OBD-II), or pre-installed cellular chip. DSRC is a valuable technology to pilot congestion pricing at highly congested locations, such as bridges and major highways, while cellular communications enable congestion pricing across entire networks.

VMT taxes can be relatively simple, or variable in space and time, facilitating transportation-agency cost recovery. A next step for roadway management is congestion pricing (CP), to better reflect the marginal delay costs of one’s travel choices. When coupled with travel credits, CP can better ensure welfare gains for most travelers.

INTRODUCTION

Traffic congestion is a major problem in all major urban areas, costing citizens valuable time. Congestion is caused by an excess of vehicles on part of a roadway at a given time, leading to vehicle speeds that are slower than the normal “free flow” speeds of that roadway (FHWA

1 2017). Congestion costs the U.S. economy over \$100 billion a year, and this number is rising
2 over time (Cebr 2014, Shrank et al. 2015, Burfeind 2017). This includes the direct costs of the
3 value of fuel and time wasted as well as the indirect costs from the increased cost of doing
4 business. As economies and populations continue to grow, congestion is expected to increase.
5 In order to combat increasing gridlock, it is important to develop policies and implement
6 technologies that reduce congestion.

7 Roadways are limited by their capacity, which is the maximum flow of traffic that can be
8 handled by a given roadway section. Capacity flow values are affected by the number and width
9 of lanes, median and merge area designs, intersection or interchange frequency, presence of stop
10 signs or signal lights, curvature, grade, and other design variables (FHWA 2017). When demand
11 for travel rises, congestion sets in, slowing travel speeds and lengthening travel times.
12 Congestion can be recurring or non-recurring. Recurring congestion is the result of normal traffic
13 volumes in a typical environment (Hallenbeck et al. 2003), such as peak times of day every
14 weekday upstream of key bottlenecks (like bridge crossings) in urban environments. Non-
15 recurring congestion is caused by unusual events or conditions that result in capacity losses or
16 added demand. Vehicle collisions, construction zones, inclement weather, and special events
17 (like professional football game days) can all result in non-recurring congestion by temporarily
18 reducing capacity or exceeding existing corridor capacities. While transportation network
19 capacities are inflexible due to the limitations of the existing infrastructure, travel demands
20 fluctuate minute to minute and day to day. Since the size of roads and freeways cannot be varied
21 to match demand, demand must be influenced to reduce congestion. Travel demand can be
22 influenced randomly by special events, weather, and other factors, but it can be actively managed
23 by implementing public policies.

24 Without regulation and pricing, the demand-supply equilibrium for roadway space settles at a
25 suboptimal point, because users only consider the direct costs of congestion on their personal
26 travel time (Komanoff 2017). Users ignore the additional marginal cost of their travel on the
27 transportation network, which adds to the travel time of all road users (Kockelman and Kalmanje
28 2005).

29 Congestion pricing is one potential solution to this issue. Such pricing or road tolling involves
30 incentivizing certain link and thus route choices for drivers, to improve the overall efficiency of a
31 congested corridor's or congested network's roadways. By charging a higher price to travel on
32 highly-congested roadway sections or offering tax credits for traveling through less-congested
33 areas, system managers can encourage choices that decrease system-wide costs and improve
34 social welfare or net community benefits. By confronting users with the true cost of their travel
35 (reflecting the delays they impose on other travelers, behind them, essentially), congestion
36 pricing pushes the supply-demand equilibrium point to the left, decreasing traffic volume. Lower
37 volume means less congestion and lower travel times on that link. Without congestion pricing,
38 drivers face only the directly experienced or average cost of travel, resulting in over-
39 consumption of what truly is a socially more expensive good than they realize. With appropriate
40 pricing in place, travel choices become less sub-optimal, and ideally reflect the full cost of added
41 vehicles on each roadway segment, at each time of day.

42 Recent and emerging developments in communication and computation technology make
43 widespread implementation of congestion pricing systems feasible and potentially highly cost-
44 effective. This paper examines the technologies and policies that could be implemented in a
45 congestion pricing system. With information gathered from various expert sources, this work

1 provides recommendations for the best mix of technology and policy in several transport
2 settings, as well as a roll-out strategy for congestion pricing.

3 **POLICY IMPLEMENTATION**

4 In order to deliver a successful and maximally cost-effective roadway pricing system, an
5 appropriate policy structure is needed. A few major pricing policies are a vehicle-miles-traveled
6 (VMT) tax, zone-based charges, and congestion pricing (CP). A VMT tax is simplest, and can
7 fittingly recover general infrastructure investment and maintenance costs, for example; but it
8 does not address congestion directly. Zone- or area-based tolling reduces travel within high-
9 traffic areas by charging for ingress or egress during specific times of day, but they are broad-
10 based and do not reflect over-use or under-use of specific links or VMT imbalances across users
11 or by time of day. Rationing by license plate and day of week or time of day has also been
12 studied and used (see, e.g., Nakamura and Kockelman [2002]), but can lead to perverse
13 outcomes (Nie 2016). CP can directly and rather efficiently (in an economic sense) address
14 congestion costs by location and time of day. Variations in tolling can influence trip generation
15 by time of day, mode choices, destination and route choices. And *credit-based* CP (CBCP) –
16 wherein CP revenues are returned uniformly to travelers to use for a base level of “free” travel
17 each month - directly addresses congestion costs in time and space while also addressing equity
18 implications, thereby delivering greater societal benefits.

19 All types of road tolls offer the opportunity to reduce congestion while collecting revenues. With
20 the rise of autonomous vehicles (AVs), some sources of public funding may fall. For example,
21 the 25 largest U.S. cities reported \$5 billion in auto-related revenues in 2016 (Maciag 2017). If
22 users opt for *shared* autonomous vehicles (SAVs), parking demand may fall, as vehicles pick up
23 new passengers. Parking fees and parking tickets make up a sizable share of *local* government
24 revenue used for infrastructure improvements in many cities (Clements and Kockelman 2017).
25 AVs will not violate traffic laws as often, decreasing revenues from traffic citations, which
26 average \$8.5 million per year in the largest U.S. cities (Maciag 2017). Additionally, use of
27 hybrid and plug-in electric vehicles (which most AVs may be, due to high power demands on
28 board) will lower revenues (per VMT) from federal and state motor fuel taxes, which accounted
29 for \$16 billion spent on local U.S. infrastructure or transit in 2015 (Maciag 2017). The
30 implementation of a VMT taxes and/or CP tolls can help local, state, and federal governments
31 maintain and supplement infrastructure budgets. Additionally, decreased congestion reduces
32 infrastructure maintenance expenses and need for new construction while benefitting citizens
33 through time savings.

34 **Vehicle-Miles-Traveled (VMT) Tax**

35 The concept of a VMT tax involves charging users for the number of miles traveled on roads
36 within a state or other jurisdiction. VMT taxes have arisen as an alternative to the gas tax, which
37 is the main source of U.S. state and other nation’s transportation budgets. The increased fuel
38 efficiency of electric and hybrid vehicles allows some users to use roadways with little to no
39 contribution highway maintenance funds, for which costs are increasing (Caltrans 2016).
40 Hopefully, automakers and consumers will continue to improve fleet fuel economy, so these
41 budgeting challenges will rise over time. A VMT fee is one way to collect appropriate taxes from
42 all vehicles to gain sufficient funding for roadways and, potentially, to discourage excessive
43 vehicle travel.

1 One way to charge users for the number of miles traveled is through odometer readings at yearly
2 vehicle inspections. However, this policy assumes all miles traveled are within the state, and
3 some users would be getting double charged if they traveled and purchased gas out of state. A
4 VMT tax can be applied only within the state operating the program by sending Global
5 Positioning System (GPS) data to calculate the number of miles traveled within the state by each
6 vehicle. This can be accomplished by using either dedicated short-range communications
7 (DSRC) or cellular communication to send the GPS data to a central database, where a public or
8 private entity would calculate the amount of money owed by each driver.

9 California, Washington, and Oregon have started pilot programs to test the feasibility and
10 efficacy of a VMT tax program. These programs track all miles driven on public roads and
11 charge users accordingly. The California Road Charge Pilot program plans to analyze a variety
12 of means for collecting road usage data, with and without the need for electronic vehicle location
13 data (Caltrans 2016). Users can choose from four types of monitoring systems: time permit,
14 mileage permit, odometer charge, and automated mileage reporting. In a time or mileage permit
15 system, the user pre-pays for the right to drive for a certain period of time or number of miles,
16 while the odometer charge allows the participant to pay a per-mile fee based on odometer
17 readings (Caltrans 2016). The automated mileage reporting option requires in-vehicle
18 equipment, which reports location data collected from vehicle telematics, smartphone apps, or
19 OBD-II port devices (Caltrans 2016). An advantage of this more advanced option is that
20 participants will not be charged for out-of-state or private road travel (Caltrans 2016).
21 Enforcement of this advanced method can be somewhat challenging, since it requires vehicles to
22 have operational hardware that has not been modified (to reduce toll totals). Participants will
23 need to be randomly audited to help ensure they are not misrepresenting their travel data to save
24 money. The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) has implemented a similar pilot,
25 which involves actual payment rather than simulated payment, with a program called OreGO.
26 The permanent program currently accepts 5,000 volunteers, who are also given an option
27 between a GPS tracking and a series of non-tracking options such as odometer readings.

28 While VMT tax policies are currently in their infancy, they may become increasingly necessary
29 with the rise of more fuel-efficient vehicles. Additionally, they enable more equitable charges
30 for road usage for all types of vehicles. The development of pilot and permanent VMT fee
31 programs that use GPS tracking could lay the foundation for the development of more advanced
32 transportation management policies that would require this location and communication
33 technology.

34 **Zone-based Tolling**

35 Zone-based tolling involves charging users for entry into, exit from, or travel within an enclosed
36 area, commonly downtown business centers, to ease traffic at peak hours. There are three main
37 types of zone-based tolling: cordon, area, and zonal (Chu 2008). Cordon charges are fees levied
38 for crossing a boundary entering or exiting an urban center. Area tolls charge for all trips within
39 the designated boundary, whether they originate outside the boundary and cross into or originate
40 inside the charge zone and never cross the boundary. Zonal charges involve mini-cordons in and
41 around an urban center, where fees are charged for entry into each mini-cordon, at flat or
42 variable rates.

43 Zone-based congestion pricing has been used in cities around the world as a means to reduce
44 congestion and emissions in urban centers. Singapore, London, Stockholm, Gothenburg, and

1 Milan have all implemented some form of zone-based congestion pricing (Brown 2011).
 2 Singapore first introduced a manually-enforced cordon charge known as the Area Licensing
 3 Scheme in 1975, which charged drivers a flat fee to enter into the central business district during
 4 peak hours (ITDP 2015). Users showed their purchased license to traffic wardens at one of 22
 5 control points to ensure compliance. In 1998, Singapore replaced the manual Area Licensing
 6 Scheme with Electronic Road Pricing (ITDP 2015). This system requires installation of an in-
 7 vehicle unit with a smart card and a DSRC system. The Singapore cordon-based congestion
 8 pricing system has resulted in lower traffic volumes, higher average vehicle speeds, and lower
 9 carbon dioxide emissions (ITDP 2015). London employs an area charge in the central
 10 downtown area between 7:00 AM and 6:30 PM on weekdays. Payments can be made at retail
 11 outlets or through electronic means on the same day, or users can purchase weekly, monthly, and
 12 annual passes (Litman 2011). Video cameras installed throughout the city record license plates,
 13 and the user pays a fine if they do not pay for downtown road usage. Drivers pay for travel
 14 within the downtown center whether or not they cross the boundary. Automobile usage
 15 decreased, public transport usage increased, and average vehicle speeds increased in urban
 16 centers (Litman 2011). However, average traffic speeds decreased and reached pre-charge levels
 17 by 2007, as London issued congestion charge exemptions and overall roadway capacity fell due
 18 to increased construction (Lehe 2019). Stockholm and Milan have reported positive results, as
 19 average vehicle speeds have increased since implementing zone-based charges (Crocchi 2016).

20 These successful programs around the world suggest that cordon-based congestion pricing is a
 21 viable and valuable program to implement in cities with large traffic volumes in dense urban
 22 centers. As seen in these examples, cordon-based congestion pricing can be implemented with
 23 different technologies that have been around for years. An advantage of this type of system is
 24 that installations are only needed at entry points to the congested area. While overall traffic
 25 volume may decrease, the users who choose to enter the restricted area may still choose routes
 26 that are suboptimal to the congestion of the roadway system. However, cordon-based pricing is
 27 an effective means for reducing traffic volumes within highly congested areas during peak
 28 periods.

29 **Congestion Pricing (CP) & Credit-Based Congestion Pricing (CBCP)**

30 Congestion pricing (CP) involves charging road users a fee that reflects the marginal cost of
 31 congestion they cause others, like those behind them in the traffic stream (Nie and Liu 2010).
 32 Current drivers make route decisions based on the shortest path or time to their destination,
 33 without considering the overall network costs of their choices. CP adds this cost into the
 34 decision-making process, making users aware of their impact on travel times for others, thereby
 35 reducing traffic along the most congested stretches of road (Kockelman and Kalmanje 2005).
 36 CP requires more implementation details than a flat VMT tax, since technology must calculate
 37 marginal tolls and communicate evolving prices to travelers. However, CP much more
 38 effectively alleviates congestion, because it incentivizes more optimal route, mode, time of day,
 39 and destination choices rather than simply incentivizing lower VMT. Such a system does require
 40 effective two-way communications, a fair pricing policy that attracts users, and an auditing
 41 process to ensure compliance.

42 Credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP) is a special case of CP policy, wherein all travelers
 43 (e.g., adult vehicle owners in a region) receive a travel credit or budget to use every month or so.
 44 Any form of CP requires observation of vehicle speeds or counts and travel times in order to
 45 evaluate the average or evolving state of congestion and marginal delay costs of added travelers

1 along any congested stretch of roadway. This information is used to price routes, with tolls rising
2 as travel times and thus marginal delay costs (changes in travel time multiplied by the number of
3 vehicles present) rise with added demand. In order to alter user behavior and ensure fairness and
4 transparency of the congestion pricing system, the toll operator should communicate the pricing
5 of alternative routes to the users via DSRC or cellular systems. This information can be
6 displayed on a smartphone or other device early enough to allow travelers (or, in the longer term,
7 self-driving vehicles) to alter their routes based on this information and their personal value of
8 time (ideally for the specific trip they are undertaking). Tolling totals are kept on each vehicle's
9 private device and reported to active roadside or other local readers (e.g., when paying for fuel)
10 to protect traveler privacy in terms of travel locations. Reliable communication and accurate
11 location data are important for ensuring tolling consistency and fairness.

12 Based on the value of each individual's value of time and the time constraints of their travel,
13 users can choose to take an alternative route in exchange for a lower cost or continue on the same
14 path for a larger fee. While many people may choose to continue along their route and pay the
15 fee, others will be influenced by this charge and opt to take a different route or travel at off-peak
16 times, which will alleviate congestion along the most congested roadways.

17 A key challenge in establishing a CP programs is the lack of strong public support. Many
18 citizens are averse to being tolled in any way (Podgorski and Kockelman 2006), but no one has
19 yet experienced credit-based tolling (in part because road managers wish to hang onto all
20 revenues, especially when gas taxes and other fees do not cover expenditures transportation
21 agencies wish to undertake - but also because it can be difficult to draw a line on credit
22 eligibility). Moreover, it takes some time to install CP technology on most or all vehicles. One
23 way to manage transition towards device installation is to charge a relatively high, flat VMT fee
24 for those not using the more advanced technology. This will help incentivize a faster shift to the
25 new system (like an on-board dongle, as discussed below). Local governments also could
26 provide users with more travel credits and/or a tax deduction to offset installation costs (e.g., 1
27 hour of time investment plus \$50 for the dongle). Regardless of approach, the pricing system
28 should be designed thoughtfully in order to ensure the cost is enough to alter travel behavior
29 without deterring too many users. Gullipalli et al. (2008) detail more specific policy
30 recommendations for effective CBCP management. Having a citizen-led committee to craft CP
31 and CBCP policies also helps ensure greater support, transparency, efficiency, equity, and
32 effectiveness.

33 Currently, a number of variably-tolled lanes exist across the U.S. and elsewhere in the world,
34 while adjacent lanes are kept "untolled", as "general purpose" lanes (TTI 2017, ULI 2013).
35 Keeping adjacent lanes untolled helps avoid public pushback, since travel credits are not
36 provided (as they would be in CBCP policies). These variably-tolled lanes are often "HOT"
37 lanes, where high-occupancy vehicles (with 2+ or 3+ persons, depending on the location and
38 time of day) do not have to pay the toll. But enforcement of HOV status is very costly, and
39 effectively impossible (due to window tints and belted dummies or dolls stymying police views
40 and pets showing up on heat sensors). Moreover, HOV and HOT policies rarely achieve much of
41 a vehicle-occupancy shift, and are instead used by HOVs that would have existed regardless of
42 the policy's implementation (e.g., family members or friends wanting to travel together). HOV
43 lanes require special entrances and exits, and separated HOT lanes required additional right of
44 way and construction costs, which are very difficult to afford and add in our network's most
45 congestion locations (Dahlgren 2002). Credit-based CP policies across all congested

1 lanes/locations is likely to be much more cost effective, physically practical, and behaviorally
2 effective than HOT lanes. But variably-tolled lanes using radio-frequency identification (RFID)
3 transponder-type technologies already exist in 15 or more U.S. locations, with tolls to keep
4 traffic moving, at either pre-determined (scheduled) intervals or dynamically, alongside the rise
5 and fall of observed demand in those special lanes.

6

7 **TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS**

8 For this paper, research was conducted on the potential technology solutions for a congestion
9 pricing system through a review of previously-published interviews and a series of expert
10 interviews. Based on the information collected during this research, three leading concepts have
11 been identified for use in a congestion pricing solution: video, DSRC, and cellular. Each of
12 these solutions requires a different mix of technologies, and each has its own advantages and
13 disadvantages. The specifications, cost, and value of each of these systems are discussed below.

14 **Video-Based System**

15 Video is one technology that could be employed to measure congestion and price links or routes
16 accordingly. Video cameras are already installed in many locations along highways and at
17 intersections, so these feeds could be harnessed to create a real-time model of traffic congestion.
18 The system would consist of a series of video cameras on poles along major roadways, a data
19 connection to send the information to a central system, and algorithms to analyze the video feed.
20 This system would then need a means to communicate with and charge toll users based on the
21 pricing of each route or link. This could come through the DSRC or cellular networks
22 previously discussed or through license plate recognition and electronic signs indicating the toll
23 for upcoming routes or boundaries.

24 The major infrastructure installations would be the camera, cable, and pole along the roadside.
25 Installations including all three of these major components could cost \$20,000-50,000,
26 depending on the quality of the camera and pole height (Lange 2017). The camera can differ
27 based on which features are included, such as the ability to zoom and pan. The pole could be
28 anywhere from 20 to 50 feet, and taller poles would allow for greater range but also would
29 increase cost (Lange 2017). Based on the average range of cameras, one could be placed
30 approximately every half-mile, depending on the road curvature, buildings, and other
31 obstructions (Lange 2017). A large portion of the cost is the pole itself, and the individual video
32 cameras themselves can be purchased for \$800-1,200 (Lange 2017). In order to toll individual
33 users, the video feed would need to be of high enough quality to capture license plate numbers of
34 passing vehicles. This may require multiple cameras at one location, or a very high-quality,
35 high-speed camera. The processing of these characters from varying angles and speeds would
36 also need to be incorporated into the software evaluating the video feed.

37 One major challenge with a video-based solution is that the pricing information cannot be
38 communicated to travelers through the same system with which traffic data is collected.
39 Communication of pricing to travelers is essential, as the goal of a congestion pricing system is
40 to alter travel behavior to alleviate congestion. The DSRC or cellular solutions described in the
41 following sections can be combined with the video feed for a comprehensive solution, but this
42 requires multiple, expensive and somewhat redundant infrastructure investments. Alternatively,
43 tolls could be implemented only at a limited number of locations and the pricing could be

1 communicated via electronic signs on the side of the road or above highways. While this
2 additional infrastructure investment limits the number of locations that tolls can be placed, it
3 increases the number of users that can participate in the program because it requires no in-
4 vehicle installation.

5 One advantage of a video-based solution is that the video infrastructure is already installed in
6 many places in major cities. Another advantage of a video-based solution is the relative ease of
7 obtaining higher levels of market penetration without every user needing a communication
8 device in his/her vehicle. Despite these advantages, additional infrastructure to communicate the
9 real-time pricing to users will be required. Such infrastructure can be prohibitively expensive if
10 added everywhere, so it normally would be implemented in a limited number of locations. The
11 challenge and cost of installing two separate systems for information collection and transmission
12 ultimately render a video-based solution less viable.

13 **DSRC-Based System**

14 Another possible solution is a congestion pricing system that uses Dedicated Short-Range
15 Communication (DSRC). DSRC is a spectrum of 75 MHz in the 5.9 GHz band that has been
16 reserved for use in vehicle safety and mobility applications (ITS 2017). DSRC is currently being
17 used in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) applications to alert drivers
18 of potential hazards, such as stopped traffic or collisions. The low latency communication of
19 two-way messages makes DSRC useful in time-sensitive situations (ITS 2017). Fast
20 communication is essential for safety applications such as crash avoidance, and it would also be
21 useful for adaptive pricing schemes in which the cost of traveling certain routes changes often.
22 Since the DSRC band is reserved for mobility applications, congestion pricing may be a useful
23 allocation of this bandwidth.

24 A DSRC system will require roadside units (RSUs) installed along roadways, along with on-
25 board units (OBUs) installed in vehicles. As vehicles pass the RSUs, a message is sent from the
26 vehicle's OBU to the RSU indicating the vehicle's position and speed, and data from all
27 vehicles' messages is compiled to model the amount of congestion in a certain area. With this
28 information, incentives for certain routes can be generated, and this information can be sent back
29 to the vehicles' OBUs via RSU messaging. Vehicle operators decide which route(s) to take
30 based on travel times and dynamic tolls. Using cloud-based tolling information, travelers can
31 also delay their trips or choose different destinations and modes.

32 Currently, most vehicles on the road are not equipped with DSRC communication. However,
33 DSRC is beginning to be incorporated into some new vehicles, and it may one day be required in
34 future vehicles, along with GPS. Some experts expect that both may be required by the National
35 Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) within the next 5-7 years (Sturgeon 2017).

36 Conventional vehicles could take advantage of a congestion pricing system by adding DSRC
37 connectivity through installation of an OBU. An on-board DSRC unit can be small, lightweight,
38 and it can be mounted on the windshield of a vehicle with Velcro or other simple fasteners
39 (Kapsch n.d.) Such a specialized OBU can cost over \$1,000 to manufacture currently, but this
40 price falls dramatically as production volumes rise, for regional applications. OBUs can
41 communicate position and speed, and relatively accurate traffic flow speed can be gathered from
42 a limited number of vehicles. As the number of vehicles equipped with DSRC increases, the
43 accuracy of this data and the benefits of a CP system increase.

1 The other major component of a DSRC-based congestion pricing system is the installation of
2 RSUs. RSUs have a line-of-sight range of about one kilometer. Due to the short range of DSRC
3 RSUs, a high density of these devices would be required. Since communication is limited by line
4 of sight, dense urban environments would require RSUs to be more compact or placed higher,
5 with longer poles and leads. Billboards, buildings, and other objects could block the signal even
6 within a short distance. Currently, RSUs are in the prototype stage and cost around \$3,000. With
7 improvements in technology and mass production, that price could go down to \$500-800. In
8 addition to the cost of producing the RSU, the installation and maintenance costs would add up
9 quickly. The installation cost could vary from \$1,000 to tens of thousands of dollars based on a
10 variety of factors. Higher leads and poles for RSUs cost more money. Connection to a
11 communication network will also increase costs, especially if a data-link backbone does not yet
12 exist. RSUs also need routine maintenance for updates or replacement if weather or other
13 external factors cause damage.

14 While a DSRC-based congestion pricing system would allow for fast communication between
15 vehicles and infrastructure, it does require a large capital investment. DSRC communication is
16 well-suited for transmitting small packets of data accurately in short periods of time. Pairing this
17 communication with a smartphone or device for route decisions would enable an effective
18 congestion pricing system. However, a DSRC-based system is limited by the cost of installing
19 DSRC units both in vehicles and in dense urban environments. Furthermore, the installation and
20 penetration of DSRC devices in infrastructure and vehicles will take a long time. For this reason,
21 some experts believe that connected vehicles may leapfrog DSRC and go straight to using 5G
22 cellular communication. Benefits can be realized with the installation of a limited number of
23 RSUs at highly congested areas, but the long time frame is an important consideration.

24 The large monetary and time investments make a DSRC-based congestion pricing system
25 challenging to implement throughout an entire transportation network. However, DSRC
26 solutions are viable for installation at major bottlenecks. A pilot program could be implemented
27 on bridges or stretches of highways that are often highly congested at certain hours. Vehicles
28 could be informed of an upcoming toll and given an alternate route option when passing the
29 DSRC unit. This initial installation would allow testing of an adaptive tolling scheme and route
30 choice data could be collected in response to congestion pricing.

31 **Cellular-Based System**

32 Of course, CP systems can also rely on cellular data. Information can be communicated via
33 smartphone or a device installed in the vehicle's on-board diagnostic (OBD) port. Each of these
34 solutions exploits the already-widespread cellular network, but uses different devices, with
35 distinct advantages and disadvantages.

36 A smartphone solution will require an app that allows users to opt-in to the service. Acceptance
37 of the agreement allows tracking of the user's location for tolling and for providing information
38 about traffic conditions and evolving toll rates. This type of system enables rather fast market
39 penetration, because most drivers already own smartphones. Users can download the application
40 that connects them to the congestion pricing system, rather than needing to install additional
41 hardware. But they must keep their cell phones on and charged, and be sure to engage the app for
42 each trip. Enforcement can be challenging when relying on ad hoc cell phone use. In addition,
43 smartphone GPS using LTE/4G cellular has not been accurate enough to identify positioning on
44 ramps or roads, especially in dense urban environments (Claudel 2017). But 5G cellular is being

1 rolled out across cities and carriers, and will be able to enable such accuracy, including for
2 reliable lane-by-lane variable-pricing applications.

3 To further improve vehicle-location accuracy, manufacturers and those retrofitting existing
4 vehicles can combine smartphone applications with installation of an inertial measurement unit
5 (IMU) in the vehicle (Claudel 2017). The IMU's accelerometer measures the linear acceleration
6 along three axes (Graves 1997). Its gyroscope, also known as an angular rate sensor, outputs
7 three signals describing the angular rate about each of the axes (Graves 1997). IMU data allows
8 the device to calculate its position based on the acceleration measurements, and it can bridge the
9 gap between position estimates when the signal is blocked (Godha and Cannon 2005).

10 Another cellular solution involves installing an OBD-II dongle in the OBD port. A dongle is a
11 small electronic device that traditionally collects emissions and malfunction data (Moran and
12 Baker 2016). Such a device can receive GPS location data and communicate using cellular data
13 (Moran and Baker 2016). It can be outfitted with a more accurate GPS system to improve the
14 resolution of the congestion pricing system. A GPS unit with lane-by-lane accuracy may cost
15 around \$200, while one with road-level accuracy may be less than \$50 (Dorfman 2017). The
16 OBD-II dongle will also need a cellular communication modem. While a mobile chip costs
17 around \$200 at low production volume, this price falls quite a bit at higher volumes (Sturgeon
18 2017). The major issue with this data cost is determining who will pay the fee. Users may be
19 willing to pay for the monetary or time benefits they gain from opting in to the program.
20 Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) may accept the cost in order to collect more data on
21 the users. Departments of transportation (DOTs) can enter into agreements with cell carriers to
22 provide this service to improve the efficiency of or gather funding from their transportation
23 network. The cost of a small data plan purchased at high volume by an OEM or DOT is
24 estimated to be \$3 to \$4 per month (Dorfman 2017). This may increase at higher volumes of
25 data communicated, but advances in technology could also decrease the cost of data.
26 Alternatively, a third-party vendor may see an opportunity in providing the service and take on
27 the cost of data communication.

28 The OBD-II dongle solution improves the problem of low-accuracy GPS included in current
29 smartphones. This solution would allow for increased standardization and ensure greater
30 fairness of a congestion pricing system. The use of OBD-II dongles does present some
31 challenges, however. Users would need to purchase and install the hardware to enable this
32 system, and they could unplug the device to avoid tolling. Additionally, the entity that would be
33 willing to pay for the cellular connection is not clear, and sufficient incentives to encourage that
34 additional cost would need to exist. Another issue is that the inclusion of OBD ports by OEMs is
35 mandated by emissions standards, so many electric vehicles do not come equipped with the
36 appropriate hardware (Dorfman 2017). So, if congestion pricing were implemented through
37 OBD installations, electric vehicles would either need to start including a similar port or their
38 users can not participate in the congestion pricing program. Additionally, much older vehicles –
39 ones that pre-date the OBD requirements -- would need special retrofits and added technology
40 (like a simple mobile phone) to participate.

41 **ADDITIONAL TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS**

42 **5G Network**

43 While some level of congestion pricing can be implemented with current 4G or Long-Term
44 Evolution cellular communication, the emergence of 5G networks will increase CP effectiveness.

1 Applying congestion pricing throughout an urban transportation network places a large data load
2 on current networks and may challenge the available bandwidth (Claudel 2017).

3 A 5G network already exists in many cities and nations, across various carriers, like AT&T in
4 the U.S. It should become available to nearly all of the U.S. and many other nations within 5 to
5 10 years, and there are a few major differences between 5G and current cellular communications.
6 New, unlicensed frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum, such as millimeter wave spectrum
7 (> 25GHz), were recently released in the U.S. by the FCC for use in 5G networks (Brodkin
8 2019). 5G allows for information to pass between individuals and between vehicles without
9 having to connect through a cell tower. Information about upcoming traffic, hazards, or road
10 pricing on routes ahead can be passed backwards along sequences of vehicles on a roadway.
11 Additionally, 5G allows for high throughput (> 10 Gigabit per second per user) and low latency
12 (< 1 ms Real Time Text) communication (Fettweis 2014). Faster, larger data transfers can allow
13 important, time sensitive travel information to be communicated more quickly and reliably.
14 Vehicles can receive congestion, safety, and road pricing information in a timely manner, and the
15 network will be able to handle the communication required for connected vehicles and
16 congestion pricing more easily.

17 There are certain challenges with the development and adoption of 5G networks for vehicles.
18 First, a business model must be developed for Low-density locations. The public value of safety-
19 critical applications in CVs may be sufficiently valuable for government entities to help deliver
20 5G in rural settings. The private telecommunications sector will need to provide the service,
21 however, and their investment will need to be profitable. Telecommunications companies may
22 charge individual users, automobile OEMs, and others based on the value to each groups. GM
23 has installed DSRC in some vehicle models, while Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) has focused more
24 on preparing its vehicles for 5G (Sturgeon 2017). The debate between 5G and DSRC will
25 continue, and it is important to stay informed about the developing value of each when
26 considering CVs and congestion pricing.

27 **Global Positioning System (GPS)**

28 Accurate location information from global positioning systems (GPS) is key to an effective
29 congestion pricing system. The accuracy of this data is important for obtaining a good
30 understanding of the traffic conditions and tolling individual users fairly for road usage. The
31 communication between satellites and GPS devices can often be interrupted or obstructed,
32 especially in dense urban areas. This phenomenon often causes the device to produce an
33 inaccurate estimation of the user's location. High accuracy is important for congestion pricing,
34 and there are varying types of GPS that offer different levels of accuracy.

35 Road-level accuracy is relatively easy to achieve with the current standard of GPS, and it should
36 be sufficient for most forms of congestion pricing. Road-level accuracy would allow users to be
37 tolled for travel on a certain route or stretch of road. Lane-level accuracy would enable greater
38 precision and allow for specially assigned lanes, which could incentivize high-occupancy travel.
39 While this would be a nice feature to add in some areas, it is not essential to effective congestion
40 pricing.

41 There are four combinations of GPS satellites and technologies that carry increasing levels of
42 accuracy. The standard GPS (SPS) included in most smartphones has 1-sigma accuracy of
43 approximately 3 meters. The standard lane is also around 3-meters, so this provides enough
44 accuracy for roads that include at least two lanes in either direction (Humphreys 2017). 31 SPS

1 satellites are currently in orbit, providing sufficient coverage. With the addition of an antenna,
 2 wide area augmentation service (WAAS) enables 1-sigma accuracy of approximately 1.5 meters
 3 (Humphreys 2017). This service allows for nearly lane-level accuracy, but there would be
 4 significant potential error.

5 Additionally, the United States-built GPS system does not offer as wide a bandwidth or as high
 6 accuracy as the Galileo satellite system being expanded by the European Union. With WAAS
 7 and good visibility, the Galileo GPS offers 1-sigma accuracy of 1 meter (Humphreys 2017).
 8 This system is sufficiently accurate to collect lane-level accuracy but could present some issues
 9 in dense urban areas with poor visibility. There are currently 24 Galileo satellites in orbit (22
 10 usable, 2 in testing), and many more expected in orbit within five years (European GNSS 2019).
 11 The ideal GPS system would be GPS L2C, which allows the GPS to communicate with a
 12 smartphone over Bluetooth. 19 of the 31 SPS satellites are currently equipped with L2C
 13 capability, and all 31 are expected to be L2C compatible within 5 years (Humphreys 2017). GPS
 14 L2C allows for 1-meter accuracy even in poor visibility, making lane-level congestion pricing
 15 possible even in dense urban centers. Table 1 summarizes the types of GPS and their accuracy
 16 capabilities.

17 **TABLE 1. GPS Accuracy Specifications** (Humphreys 2017)

Type of GPS System	1-Sigma Accuracy (meters)	Level of Accuracy
Standard Positioning Service (SPS)	3	Road-level
SPS + Wide Area Augmentation (WAAS)	1.5	Near lane-level
Galileo + WAAS	1 (good visibility)	Lane-level
SPS or Galileo + L2C	1 (poor visibility)	Reliable lane-level

18
 19 The current GPS systems are capable of road-level accuracy that would allow for some level of
 20 congestion pricing, and the advancement of GPS technology will allow for lane-level accuracy.
 21 While high accuracy is possible, the solutions do require an installation of a GPS antenna in
 22 addition to a smartphone or other device. So, the accuracy of location information is a challenge
 23 to congestion pricing, but current technology is sufficiently accurate for a basic system. With the
 24 correct systems in place, congestion pricing can be implemented fairly and accurately.

25 **PRIVACY & SECURITY**

26 Privacy and security are major concerns when handling personal location data of a large pool of
 27 users. The privacy and security issues with each solution differ based on the method of data
 28 collection and communication used. These potential problems are important when evaluating the
 29 reliability and safety of congestion pricing applications.

30 For a video-based system, there is some concern about capturing images of users and non-users
 31 along roadways at all times. Monitoring users who do not opt in to the congestion pricing
 32 service seems to be a small invasion of privacy. However, cameras are installed along many
 33 roadways, and are not an illegal invasion of privacy in many places (Claudel 2017). While video

1 cameras may cause some backlash from citizens who are especially concerned about privacy, the
2 concern is not as great as applications using GPS location data.

3 For cellular and DSRC solutions that use GPS location data to track the routes of users, the
4 privacy concern is greater. For these location-based applications, it would be essential to offer
5 users the opportunity to opt in rather than mandating sharing of location information. Allowing
6 the government to handle personal location information at all times would likely deter some
7 users. A private-sector, third party service provider could handle the data, which may ease the
8 worries of some consumers, but data privacy would still be a concern.

9 Cellular communication would carry the same risks that current cellular service does. 3G has
10 known security issues, and it can be spoofed relatively easily (Sturgeon 2017). 4G is more secure
11 and is the most common technology insurance companies and OEMs currently use for vehicle
12 monitoring (Sturgeon 2017). While location and speed information are anonymized for many
13 DSRC safety applications, applications that toll individual users cannot be truly anonymous.
14 Encryption and decryption of user information would be necessary to prevent hacking, and this
15 would add to the overhead cost of implementing a congestion pricing system (Sturgeon 2017).

16 Malicious users could gain access to sensitive personal location information if the CP
17 communications are not robustly designed or monitored properly. Concerns about people
18 hacking into and assuming some control of automated vehicles are unlikely to be valid in CP
19 applications, since in-vehicle installations for data remittance should be designed to be only
20 “push” (rather than receive) information and should be partitioned from vehicle controls (Claudel
21 2017). In other words, as with connected vehicles, communications should and will be separated
22 from vehicle control programs. Security and privacy are important concerns of a location-based
23 congestion pricing application, and they must be priorities during implementation and
24 operations. Fortunately, many road-pricing systems do exist, in Singapore, Stockholm and
25 Southern California, with third-party account managers and scrambled IDs providing meaningful
26 privacy protections.

27 Furthermore, creating a centralized system for managing CP policy creates a single point of
28 vulnerability that could be subject to attack on a system-wide level. To mitigate this, a CP system
29 can be designed with great care to allow for decentralization, by distributing the system’s various
30 responsibilities across multiple hardware units in multiple locations. In doing so, a system-wide
31 attack becomes more difficult for a malicious agent, and any such attack would likely disable
32 only a small portion of the system at any given time.

33 **COMPLIANCE & AUDITING**

34 In order to ensure compliance with a congestion pricing system, an auditing process would need
35 to be created. Users could tamper with the GPS location or communication devices in order to
36 avoid toll payment. At the state level, vehicle inspections required by some states for
37 registration offer the opportunity to ensure correct operation of the devices. If a congestion
38 pricing user is not compliant with the required standards, he could be denied vehicle approval
39 and the incident would be reported.

40 While inspection may catch some malfunctioning devices, users who are intentionally avoiding
41 fees would likely fix their vehicles before taking them into registration. An auditing process
42 with an external check on location could be added to the congestion pricing policy. Video
43 cameras are one possible check on a vehicle’s location. A few video cameras at major

1 bottlenecks could capture vehicle license plates, and this information could be matched with the
2 location data transmitted by the vehicle. If the GPS data does not indicate the same vehicle
3 location at the time and date the video was captured, the user would be noncompliant with the
4 congestion pricing system. The vehicle would then be investigated for tampering, and a fine
5 would be issued to the user of that vehicle if it is found to be illegally altered.

6 While it is not economically feasible to audit every vehicle regularly, a selection of vehicles
7 could be audited periodically. A portion of license plate numbers would be chosen, and this
8 number would be searched for in video footage. While this would not necessarily catch all
9 people using GPS or communication jammers, it would likely deter people due to the chance of
10 being caught and fined.

11 **A HARDWARE MIGRATION PATH FORWARD**

12 To ensure successful implementation of policies recommended, the implementation plan should
13 be as straightforward as possible. Three key facets for successful management schemes are:
14 impact measurement, agency communication, and driver-system interactions. This section
15 proposes a potential migration path forward that improves these facets incrementally. With
16 careful design, the technology required for the various schemas discussed in this paper can be
17 made modular, allowing for the development of a migration plan like that shown in Figure 1.
18 This plan allows for the reuse of hardware until such point as it becomes obsolete, when it can be
19 replaced by technology that can provide for more advanced management methodologies.

20 As illustrated in Figure 1, the most basic (“bare-bones”) VMT Tax requires an odometer read.
21 This method’s drawbacks, discussed above, can be a significant disincentive for those that
22 regularly drive outside the taxed region, so an odometer-based method may overcharge for many
23 owners (and undercharge others, who register their vehicles elsewhere but spend significant
24 distance in the taxed region). To improve upon this, a “headless” (i.e., non-displayed) GPS
25 system can be implemented which would track users without any form of telecommunications
26 equipment. The position tracking equipment can be of various levels of spatial accuracy, since
27 lane-level accuracy is not yet needed. (Such hardware will be valuable later in this process, and
28 sufficient planning should allow for an easy upgrade to achieve this.) In this VMT Tax scenario,
29 a reading of the vehicle’s mileage is still needed, but its accuracy will be much more reflective of
30 a driver’s impact on traffic congestion within the taxed region or state. One downside to this
31 approach is that the vehicle owner(s) may not appreciate mileage until the reading is taken, but
32 reading stations may be common (and remotely managed for most vehicles, at existing gantries
33 and gas pumps, for example).




FIGURE 1. Technology Migration Plan for VMT and CP Tolling Schemas

A “high-end” VMT Tax system would rely on an instantaneous or regular telecommunications module (via DSRC or cellular), as discussed earlier, allowing agencies and vehicle owners to be updated regularly on mileage and perhaps location. This can be accomplished using an application or text and/or email updates. Such methods limit data or bandwidth use and can assist in automating the auditing process by reducing human intervention in the tax-reporting process. Additional messaging will be needed to keep drivers apprised on taxes owed and paid.

A proper CP system will need travelers and drivers to appreciate tolls in real time and in advance, at least approximately, to plan trips and tours. To address this need, the system’s final addition is information online/in the cloud to access at any time of day and ideally displayed to drivers within the vehicle. The amount of data transmitted through this real-time road-pricing system is much higher than that of a flat VMT Tax system, and locational accuracy of GPS modules becomes rather key, to avoid tolling the wrong rate, from a nearby and parallel link, for example, or in urban canyons, where added positioning information will be needed (as satellites become obscured). Regardless, such advanced modules are not needed during the transition phases, and can be deployed as technology and other resources become available.

CONCLUSION

VMT fees and CP are related, but distinctive, transportation policies. VMT fees primarily help state and local governments gain funding for roadways with declining revenue from the gas tax, with a small possible congestion benefit. Some users may opt to travel fewer miles with their VMT being monitored, but this does not alter the routes they will take. CP should be far more effective in alleviating congestion, as this policy emphasizes location or link selection by time of

1 day, based on local congestion delays. However, the technologies and systems required for each
2 program are similar.

3 VMT fees and CP can be implemented with DSRC or cellular technology. VMT fees are a
4 simpler system, so they could be implemented first. This would allow DOTs to gain additional
5 revenue, gain experience with collecting vehicle location data, and identify potential compliance
6 challenges. If DSRC units are placed along major roadways, the location data held in the vehicle
7 can be transferred to the central database periodically to charge VMT fees. The funds collected
8 from VMT fees can be used to improve roadways or invest in additional technology. With this
9 experience, the same entities could move into implementing CP for additional benefits to the
10 transportation network. The same DSRC units could be used to collect information on vehicle
11 speed and location and communicate route pricing at these highly congested locations. If the CP
12 program proves valuable, it can be expanded through cellular communication. VMT fees are a
13 good first step in technology-based roadway management, while CP can take advantage of the
14 technology in place to further improve transportation network use efficiencies.

15 **Technology Recommendation**

16 This paper analyzed the viability of DSRC, cellular, and video technologies for use in roadway
17 pricing. The value of each of these technologies is based solely on its value for addressing
18 congestion delays, rather than use in connected vehicles generally. The technologies were
19 evaluated based on their effectiveness for this application, current level of market penetration,
20 and the scalability throughout a transportation network. These criteria were evaluated on a scale
21 representing their relative values. The ability of each technology to be applied to the major
22 policies of VMT fees and credit-based CP (CBCP) was also taken into account.

24 First, the effectiveness of each technology when applied to congestion pricing was considered.
25 DSRC and cellular solutions are both similarly effective in transferring information to and from
26 vehicles. Both systems are able to transfer small data packets known as basic safety messages
27 (BSMs), which include vehicle location and speed. DSRC currently allows for lower latency
28 communication, but this is not as important for congestion pricing as it is for vehicle safety
29 applications because routing decisions are not as time-sensitive as collision avoidance
30 maneuvers. Video can collect congestion information in order to price roads, but it lacks the
31 ability to communicate information back to the users, which is required to change user behavior
32 and reduce congestion. A video solution would need to be combined with electronic signage
33 indicating the price of upcoming routes or with DSRC or cellular communication. This limits
34 the scope of a video-based solution since it requires costly, redundant technology. Therefore,
35 cellular or DSRC solutions will be most effective for the longer term.

36 Cellular technology is widespread in urban centers, as it employs cell towers that enable long-
37 distance communication. The infrastructure is already in place for 4G communication around
38 the world, in developed nations, and it is currently used to transfer data between smartphones
39 and other connected devices. Video cameras are installed along some stretches of roads and
40 intersections, but they are not widely installed along roadsides throughout cities. DSRC is also
41 not widely available, and RSUs would need to be installed densely along roadways.
42 Additionally, both video and DSRC systems would require installations at short intervals along
43 the roadways, while cellular communication has much longer range. Both DSRC units and video
44 cameras are recommended about every half-mile, so installing these throughout a transportation
45 network could be costly (Lange 2017).

1 DSRC is recommended for locations with high congestion in the short term, as a pilot system.
 2 Bridges, major highways, and other commonly congested stretches of roads are terrific locations
 3 for such pilots. RSUs could be placed a mile or two before these major bottlenecks to
 4 communicate route and pricing options to arriving travelers, and then again at section entrance,
 5 to notify on-board devices of toll charges. The use of congestion pricing at each region's most
 6 congested points and corridors will encourage use of alternative routes, driving at off-peak times
 7 of day, and/or changes in trip destination, mode and generation decisions, in order to reduce the
 8 travel costs. In the long term, however, cellular systems will be more effective in tolling entire
 9 urban transportation networks. With the ability to toll large areas using cellular networks,
 10 congestion pricing can be effectively scaled to decrease congestion throughout a network rather
 11 than just a few key nodes or on a few links. Such widespread traffic demand management can be
 12 crucial in avoiding spillovers from targeted pricing, given how extensive road networks and
 13 route substitutes are. Potentially more important, is the option of credit-based congestion pricing
 14 (CBCP), to ensure everyone has reasonable access to the network and a region's travel options,
 15 regardless of income. A combination of VMT fees for system maintenance (and some scheduled
 16 expansions, if needed) along with CP where all CP revenues are returned as travel credits, is
 17 likely to be the long-term solution, as the gas tax erodes in many states, thanks to more travelers
 18 shifting to electric vehicles and hopefully a less environmentally unsustainable future.

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